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1 Among the different topics that have marked the intersection of analytical thinking and
other  philosophical  perspectives,  such  as  phenomenology,  hermeneutics,  and
pragmatism, “the study of man” is perhaps among those that have been less explored.
With  this  expression,  I  intend  to  refer  to  that  field  of  research  crossing  the  whole
Twentieth Century which aims at answering to contemporary challenges through the
redefinition of the place of the modern man and of his relationships to the social and
natural world. If we consider the strenuous interest of Husserl and his followers to the
problem  of  intersubjectivity  and  of  the  life-world,  the  methodical  reformulation  of
interpretation  and  of  communicative  processes  in  the  hermeneutical  tradition,  the
primacy  of  linguistic  games  in  Wittgenstein’s  conception  of  Weltbild  and,  not  lastly,
Dewey’s conception of a naturalistic humanism, we can easily identify in these different
assumptions a shared philosophical intuition: that of a new humanism. Georg Henrik von
Wright is one of the thinkers that have pursued with the greatest strength the task of
joining together western philosophy and science in order to think anew the role and
identity of the contemporary man. For this reason, he can be considered to be one of the
last and most rigorous ‘humanists.’
2 In the “Intellectual Autobiography,” written in 1973 for the volume dedicated to him in
the Library of Living Philosophers, von Wright had indicated the “search for a new humanist
attitude” as the characteristic of the mature phase of his thought.1 Seven years after, in
the “Postscript 1980” to the “Autobiography” he came back on this subject to emphasise
the  presence  in  his  research  of  an  unresolved  tension  between  the  logical  and
epistemological intent behind his writings, on the one hand, and his “craving for a more
‘visionary’ grasp of the totality of human existence,” on the other. It is to the search for a
Weltanschauung able to fill the gap within the “double soul” of his philosophy and to bring
together  the  various  elements  that  dwelt  therein,  that  von Wright  seems to  tie  the
emergence  of  topics  such  as  the  man-nature  relationship,  the  future  of  Western
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civilization, and the problems of scientific and technological progress; these issues, in
fact, have appeared more and more frequently in his work over the past two decades.
3 Over the twenty years that have passed from the “Postscript” until his recent volume, In
the Shadow of Descartes: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind,2 von Wright’s philosophical activity
has, indeed, interwoven multiple directions of research, which have helped to create new
links and to clarify the articulation of essential points of reference. But of more interest,
perhaps, than an identification of the individual aspects of von Wright’s research would
be a search for the unitary ground, if it exists, that connects them. This could, in fact, be
the same ground that lies at  the basis of  his  conception of  natural  determinism and
human acting, which had, even earlier, informed his attempts to identify the connections
and differences between acting and causation, between time and truth. It could concern
the “humanization of nature” which inspires, in his more recent work, the critique of the
misconceptions within the traditional dualisms of man-nature, freedom-necessity, good-
evil, values-facts, and mind-body, as well as his reformulation of the problem regarding
man’s place in nature and the relationship between the human and the natural sciences.
4 In connection with the problems of temporality and determinism, von Wright published
around  the  middle  of  the  Seventies  writings  on  the  theme  of  “humanism,”  the
importance of which he himself mentions in “Postscript 1980.” In reality, this interest in
what  he  called  the  “neo-humanistic  attitude”  is  anything  but  new  in  von  Wright’s
thought. In the Sixties his writings with a specific analytical commitment intersect with
essays on humanistic  problems.  For example,  some works published in 1963 like The
Varieties of  Goodness,  Norm and Action,  The Logic of  Preference find their counterparts in
essays like “The Tree of Knowledge” (1960), which will give the title to a later collection
of  papers  (1993),  and “Essay  om naturen,  människan och den vetenskapligt-tekniska
revolutionen” (1963), which anticipate in many ways his reflections in the decades that
followed.
5 Running throughout von Wright’s entire itinerary is the philosophical practice that is
shaped, not only by the problems and methods of logic and of philosophical analysis, but
also by the “study of  man,” and that pays heed to the themes which,  from the pre-
Socratics  to  Nietzsche,  have  oriented  philosophy  toward  the  search  for  a
“Weltanschauung” and a “Sinn des Lebens.” He himself has also recently acknowledged
the “double track” of his research and, in the brief but illuminating “Introduction” to The
Tree of Knowledge, attributes its existence, in large part, to the influence exercised on him
by the personalities of his two masters: Eino Kaila and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
6 In a page of the “Replies” included in Schilpp’s volume, von Wright lists all of four phases
in his  investigation ofhumanism:  the first  youthful  phase of  aesthetic  humanism,  the
second ethical phase of the Forties and Fifties, the third rationalist one of the Sixties, and
the fourth social-humanist phase, which extends up to the mid-Seventies. The writings of
those  years  reflect  his  reawakened  interest  in  Hegel’s  and  Marx’s  thought  and  the
problems of the social and political Weltbild. Moreover, one can reasonably assume that
the 1976 essay mentioned in the “Postscript”: “What is Humanism?” opens a fifth phase in
his studies on humanism. But in what way is this phase “new” in the context of von
Wright’s production over the last two decades? In his writings from 1976-77 up to the
essays collected in The Tree of Knowledge and beyond,3 it is clear that the “two tracks” of
his research, while taking shape in ways of philosophizing that are distinct for their style
and content,  nonetheless  present  an affinity of  conceptions and intents.  Von Wright
establishes a link, which had not been made explicitly in his previous writings, between
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his theses about free action and the problems of humanism. It could, perhaps, be said
that, in the more recent “humanistic” essays, the problematic nucleus that had remained
in the background of the “analytical” essays is laid bare and comes into the limelight.
7 The special relevance of the fourth social-humanist phase of von Wright’s search for a
humanist  attitude  could  be  identified  in  the  revision  of  his  previous  rationalist
conception, according to which the science of man must be modeled on the exact sciences
of nature and integrated into a more comprehensive, unitary science.4 This revision will
be carried to its conclusion in Explanation and Understanding (1971), where his dualistic
vision of the study of man and of nature will develop a vision that von Wright considers
very close to what he calls the “Aristotelian” tradition and opposed to the monistic and
scientistic  positions  which  have  kept  alive  up  to  our  days  the  “Galilean”  tradition.5
Nevertheless, in his writings on humanism in the past two decades, a perspective emerges
which further corrects the point of view of Explanation and Understanding. Instead of the
heritage of the Aristotelian tradition, there one can easily recognise the reflection of a
new source of inspiration, precisely that of the “Kantian” tradition which we have seen
underpinning  von  Wright’s  most  recent  investigations  into  man’s  place  in  nature,
between the intelligible world of causal laws and the noumenal world of the ideals of
reason. Significant traces of this inspiration are present in many works of the period,
particularly  in  one  of  the  more  important  and  articulated  essays  of  von  Wright’s
production: Of Human Freedom (1985). It is, perhaps, in the agreement with the special
form of  compatibility between natural  necessity and free will,  between causality and
freedom, which Kant recognised when he considered the condition of man as a “citizen of
two worlds,” that one can catch sight of the link that sums up von Wright’s way to escape
from the “deterministic illusion,” on one hand, and from the “dream” of what he calls the
“restoration” of a world that had seemed lost and of a human condition that had been
fatally compromised by cognitive hybris.6
8 In contrast with the prevalent version of compatibilism, i.e. with its meaning as peaceful
coexistence,  as  stability  in  principle,  almost  as  mutual  indifference,  von  Wright’s
indicates with this name a relation that is anything but stable, anything but painless,
perhaps a search for a balance that has always been sought and never achieved. The fact
that  human action is  both free and determined is  itself  already a  sign of  its  radical
doubleness, of the instability and dramatic nature intrinsic to the condition of man in the
world. Therefore his interpretation of the “dream” to escape from the dualism of freedom
and determinism is, at heart, not so much with the view of “solving” it, in keeping with
the style of problem- solving typical of the theoretical procedures of science, as it is to
“dissolve” the illusion that pervades European culture in its most meaningful expressions
– Greek and Judeo-Christian – that it is possible to treat the ideals of the reason with the
categories of the intellect, and the problems of metaphysics with the tools of science. In
effect the way out from the dualism of freedom and determinism is the central problem
in the Tanner Lectures entitled Of Human Freedom, where it is “resolved” by showing that
the irreconcilability  traditionally  accorded to these concepts  is,  in  effect,  a  “pseudo-
conflict.” The notion of determinism in the framework of actions for reasons cannot be
confused with the notion of universal determinism used in the framework of the natural
sciences. As Kant said, the liberty of the practical use of reason and submission to natural
laws are not contradictory and therefore not incompatible. The clarification suggested by
this  distinction,  which von Wright proposes as a “solution,” is,  in reality,  not a new
“theory” that defends, with new arguments, the reconcilability of determinism and free
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will; rather, he is showing how the “problem” of that reconciliation, once the differences
are made clear, simply disappears, and the “solution” to the problem is precisely this.
9 Von  Wright’s  philosophical  neo-humanism  consists  precisely  in  showing  the
irrealisability – the “dream” indeed – of fusing the varied forms of human rationality, of
crystallising them within a single and conclusive theoretical schema, which assumes the
model of scientific knowledge as its paradigm. According to von Wright, the monistic
tendencies present in the great traditions of the past survive in the positivistic and neo-
positivistic programs of a unitary science, of the unification of the theories and methods
of  the  natural  and human sciences,  and,  above all,  in  the  intellectual orientation of
today’s  scientific  and  technological  revolution.  This  tendency  aims  to  obscure  the
multiple forms in which the human condition is  expressed,  and it  “provides a  quasi
theoretical justification for manipulations of society by individuals and groups who are in
a position to ‘engineer’ or ‘steer’ the social process.”7 Once the impracticability of the
monistic expectation has been made clear and the illusion that lies at its base has been
unmasked,  the  problem  of  avoiding  the  contradictions  between  nature  and  reason,
between causality and freedom, reappears under a new form, not that of their mutual
reduction or identification, but of “a more articulate schema of understanding”8 which
“dissolves,”  that  is,  makes  meaningless  any form of dualism,  as  well  as  any form of
reductionism. The concepts involved in the old dualism do not refer to substances which
can be reduced or identified: their meaning is, as we know, determined by the contexts in
which they are used, by their reference to the symbolic challenges (institutions, rules,
and norms) to which they respond.
10 In the 1960 essay “The Tree of Knowledge,” which anticipates by about twenty years his
more mature formulations on philosophical humanism, von Wright had manifested his
first doubts about the optimistic belief in a positive outcome for the transformations in
the style of human life stemming from scientific-technological progress and from the
age-old search for a hegemonic form of rationality. Precisely because of the emblematic
significance enjoyed by the biblical myth referring to the tree of the knowledge of good
and evil in representing the destiny of man when dominated by cognitive hybris,  von
Wright included this essay in the volume published in 1993 under the same title. In the
two parts  that  constitute  the  book,  he  collected  his  autobiographical  and historical-
critical contributions to the formulation of the great themes of philosophical logic and
analytical philosophy, as well as his considerations about the condition and the destiny of
man in the modern age. Far from taking the form of a kind of “theory of culture,” these
considerations express, instead, his attempt to offer a “diagnosis of our time,” the result
of which is to bring to light those tendencies that, asserted throughout the course of
Western  culture,  have  proposed  an  illusory  rationalisation  of  the  relation  between
science and reason, between man and nature, and have given credit to the prevalence of
forces  whose  aim  is  the  dehumanization  and  self-annihilation  of  man  and  of  his
environment.
11 According to von Wright, the dangers deriving from the loss of identity of man, of his
dehumanization are exemplified by the classical myths that narrate the expulsion from
Eden, the punishment of Prometheus, and the damnation of Faust, are re-proposed, in
one of von Wright’s most charming essays, in his reference to Dante’s invention of the
final voyage of Ulysses and his shipwreck at the forbidden boundaries of the world.9 What
is the significance of the mythological stories from a philosophical point of view? First of
all,  they show the doubleness of human rationality and, hence, its intrinsically tragic
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nature: that is, that knowledge can, at the same time, be an instrument of good and of
evil, of emancipation and of damnation. In the conclusion to “The Tree of Knowledge”
von Wright states that the three myths
are all tragic, either in the sense – as in the Paradise myth and in the Faust saga –
that they show us man torn between the two poles of light and darkness, or in the
sense  –  as  in  the  Prometheus  myth –  that  they  depict  a  struggle  of  man for  a
fundamentally just cause, but blinded by self-overconsideration. (153)
12 The leitmotiv common to the three myths consists precisely in the double potential for
good and evil intrinsic in the desire for knowledge that pervades human reason. In the
biblical story, as in the myth of Prometheus and in the saga of Faust, von Wright sees a
prefiguration  of  the  human  condition  which  he  had  so  significantly  expressed  in
“Determinism and the Study of Man” (1976) defining man as both a slave and the master
of his own destiny, and his actions as intrinsically marked by the requirement of being
both free and determined.
13 This  basic  doubleness  cannot  be  eliminated  without  paying  the  price  of  progressive
dehumanization, leading to self-destructive results: if man were not determined, he could
not exercise his freedom; if he were not free, he could not act rationally. The risk to
which the human condition is exposed, clenched between a desire for knowledge and the
very limits of its nature, is obviously represented in the language of these myths: man in
Eden, Prometheus, and Faust all  share the human desire for knowledge, but,  as their
exemplary stories show, it can become a “lethal game” and, if turned into an absolute,
can lead to sin, to damnation, and to death. Sin, damnation, and death are labels,  or
figures,  for the destructive processes that man primes for firing when he tries to go
beyond his nature, wishing to become omniscient and omnipotent, to be the equal of the
gods in his sovereign power over the nature, to surpass the limits of his temporality by
making the fleeting moment eternal. In this gallery of myths, von Wright gives a place no
less important to Dante’s Ulysses, who, “in pursuit of virtue and knowledge,” finds death
by overstepping the boundaries of the inhabited world.
14 By digging into the rich mythology of the biblical account and the tales of Prometheus, of
Ulysses, and of Faust, and into the interpretations that philosophy, literature, and art
have given them over the centuries, von Wright brings to light the profound similarities
that the truths hidden in the language of myth have with “modern” expressions of the
human desire for knowledge: science unbound from any form of authority (the fruit of
the knowledge of good and evil), progress as the bearer of happiness (the gift of fire to
man still in the wild state), the victory over time and death (the pact with the devil in
exchange  for  one’s  soul)  –  these  are  all  images,  in  turn  poetic,  philosophical,  and
religious,  of  the  destiny  that  awaits  a  world  and  a  society  threatened  by  the
absolutization of the proper values of technological civilization.10
15 Is the aspiration to knowledge, therefore, fatally destined to become tragedy? Do science
and technology, born from the need to liberate and emancipate mankind, inevitably lead
to a new form of slavery? In the face of the urgency of these questions, the classical myths
lose their apparent, banal meaning of illustrating divine abuses with regard to man, the
triumph of violence over justice, and assume the dimension of a severe warning: human
reason, in the complex formed by its abilities and cognitive acquisitions, can contribute
to making man freer,  but also to making him more of a slave.  Dante had pointed to
salvation, in the form of the intervention of a higher grace, and the restoration of a lost
equilibrium. For modern man, it is not possible to return to paradise lost; Dante’s dream
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is over: “der Traum ist ausgeträumt,” as Husserl would say. Nevertheless, it remains a
regulating ideal: no power exists if not that of human reason itself to turn knowledge into
an instrument of salvation rather than damnation:
There is no way back for us moderns either to Ancient belief in a self-preserving
cosmic harmony or to Dante’s  dream of the restoration of a universal  Christian
commonwealth. We must try to attain our own self-reflective understanding of our
situation. And I have wanted to say that it belongs to this achievement that we take
warning  of  the  fate  which  the  poet  foresaw  for  the  non-Homeric  Ulysses  who
steered his vessel beyond the pillars of Hercules and thereby entered the road to
self-annihilation.11
16 The “lesson” that von Wright seeks to draw from the warning implicit in the tales of the
great myths is to conceive man’s place in nature from a perspective that we will call
“humanistic,”  with reference to a  conception of  the problem that  harks  back to the
“Humanists” of the Renaissance, such as Pico della Mirandola, and reaches, I would say,
up to Kant’s Copernican revolution. Contrary to Kepler’s later deterministic conceptions,
Pico’s man, as he presented him in his 1486 work Oratio de hominis dignitate, has no fixed
place in the great order of things. It is up to man himself to choose his place, what he will
be: beast or angel or something in between.12
17 Von  Wright’s  humanism can  be  seen  in  his  conception of  the  dynamic  relationship
between man and the natural world, a relationship that, to a certain extent, incorporates
his “very special” idea of compatibility formulated in Of Human Freedom.
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NOTES
1. Schilpp & Hahn (1989: 41).
2. Von Wright 1998.
3. The main writings to which we are referring, directly or indirectly, in our reconstruction of
von Wright’s philosophical humanism are the following: von Wright 1960, 1979, 1987, 1989, 1990,
1991, 1997.
4. See on this topic the illuminating essay by Tranøy 1974.
5. Von Wright 1971, chapter I.
6. Von Wright (1990: 196-7).
7. Schilpp & Hahn (1989: 843-4).
8. Von Wright (1980, Preface).
9. See von Wright 1990, and also my Introduction in Egidi 1999.
10. See von Wright 1989, and 1991.
11. Von Wright (1990: 200-1).
12. Von Wright (1979: 4).
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